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In writing this tract I have dared to believe that
many things were possible because of the personal
example offered to all who practice journalism by
Mr. C. P. Scott, for over forty-five years editor-in-
chief of the Manchester Guardian. In the light of his
career it cannot seem absurd or remote to think of
freedom and truth in relation to the news.
Two of the essays in this volume, “What Modern
Liberty Means” and “Liberty and the News” were
published originally in the Atlantic Monthly. I wish
to thank Mr. Ellery Sedgwick for the encouragment
he gave me while writing them, and for permission
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THE TWIN CRISES OF DEMOCRACY AND
JOURNALISM
Introduction to the mediastudies.press edition
Sue Curry Jansen
Liberty and the News was published a century ago this year. A small doi
book—consisting of two essays previously published in the Atlantic
Monthly, joined together by a short introductory chapter—it seemed
an unpretentious offering by Walter Lippmann (1889–1974). It was
young Lippmann’s fifth book, and, as a compilation, commentators
have long considered it a minor work. Yet the questions it raised
about journalism and democracy became the catalyst for a period
of generative thinking by the author, leading to his classic, Public
Opinion (1922), and its sequel, The Phantom Public (1925). The issues
this little book identified would continue to influence Lippmann’s
thinking about the role of the media and the public throughout his
long life.1 1 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922);
and Lippmann, The Phantom Public
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1925).
Lippmann wrote Liberty in the immediate aftermath of his military
service in France and his attendance at the peace negotiations in Ver-
sailles as an assistant to Colonel House, President Woodrow Wilson’s
chief advisor. Like so many members of the so-called Lost Genera-
tion, Lippmann felt deeply disillusioned by his wartime experiences.
Liberty marked his initial attempt at coming to terms with the chasm
that separated the idealism that had attracted him to a career as a
journalist and public intellectual, and the systemic barriers that too
often undermined the values fueling that idealism. Lippmann, who
always chose his words carefully, referred to these obstacles as “cen-
sorships.”
Lippmann’s use of the term censorship has not received adequate
attention in the voluminous analyses and critical commentaries
penned by generations of readers and interpreters. Yet censorship
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was a pressing public issue when Lippmann wrote Liberty, as was its
counterpart, propaganda. Both vividly shaped the author’s immedi-
ate experiences during World War I.
Lippmann was one of the founding editors of the New Republic in
1914—a magazine that published many of America’s most influential
intellectuals. Its editorial board had supported Wilson’s re-election
in 1916 and strongly favored U.S. entry into the war. In preparation
for the mobilization of troops, Colonel House asked Lippmann to
prepare a memorandum on wartime information policy. In response,
Lippmann recommended that the Wilson administration set up an
official news bureau that would provide the public with accurate in-
formation, and identify and discredit rumors and falsehoods. He also
urged the administration to avoid arbitrary censorships. Lippmann
recognized that some censorship was necessary during wartime to
protect the troops, but contended that “protection of a healthy pub-
lic opinion” was of “first importance.”2 Wilson was not persuaded. 2 Quoted in Ronald Steel, Walter Lipp-
mann and the American Century (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1980), 125.
Instead, the president authorized the creation of the Committee on
Public Information (CPI), which insiders at the time referred to col-
loquially as the “Ministry of Information.”3 The CPI was headed by 3 James R. Mock and Cedric Larson,
Words That Won the War: The Story of
the Committee on Public Information,
1917–1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1939).
George Creel, a former journalist whom Lippmann had heavily crit-
icized for some of his coverage of the 1913–1914 Colorado coalfields
labor conflicts that included what came to be known as the Ludlow
Massacre.
The CPI developed into a propaganda behemoth with more than
thirty divisions, including a censorship board; it exercised unprece-
dented influence over well-nigh every aspect of American life. Every
available form of media was used to support the CPI’s messaging,
with the help of writers, journalists, artists, cartoonists, the film and
advertising industries, clergy, school teachers, citizen volunteers,
social clubs, and virtually everyone who had an audience, no mat-
ter how small. News was censored following “voluntary” rules that
sanitized and glorified the war. Other U.S. government entities also
imposed restrictions on free expression. Congress enacted alien and
sedition acts. The postmaster assumed the role of censor by refus-
ing to send through the mail socialist and other periodicals deemed
offensive. Massive deportations of foreign-born war critics ensued;
prominent war protesters, including the former presidential candi-
date Eugene Debs, were arrested and given long prison sentences;
radical college professors were fired; and with mounting war hys-
teria, fanned by the CPI, discrimination against German Americans
increased as well. Lippmann himself completed his military service
in a propaganda unit in France, composing leaflets that urged Ger-
man soldiers to surrender and interviewing German prisoners of
war.
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By 1920, censorship amounted to more than an intellectual and
professional concern for Lippmann; it had a visceral meaning for
him, fueling his heated rhetoric. That year, he also published as a
supplement to the New Republic a study of self-censorship by the
press, co-authored with his longtime friend and colleague Charles
Merz and titled “A Test of the News.”4 Pioneering content analysis 4 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz,
with the assistance of Faye Lippmann,
“A Test of the News,” New Republic,
August 4, 1920, 3.
as a method for assessing media bias, Lippmann and Merz analyzed
coverage of the Russian Revolution in the New York Times. “A Test”
was more than twice as long as Liberty; it examined more than 3,000
Times articles covering Russia from March 1917 to March 1920. The
overall conclusion? The Times, one of America’s most trusted news
sources, failed the test. According to Lippmann and Merz, the pa-
per’s news coverage of Russia was “dominated by the hopes of the
men who composed the news organization.” The journalists saw
what they wanted to see, not what was actually happening. Lipp-
mann and Merz concluded that “the chief censor and chief propagan-
dist were hope and fear in the minds of the reporters and editors.”5 5 Lippmann and Merz, “A Test of the
News,” 3.Their desire to win the war and see the revolution defeated led them
to systematically misrepresent the facts in Russia.
Today, we should read “A Test of the News” as a companion to,
or even a missing chapter of, Liberty. It provided Lippmann with
credible empirical evidence to support the arguments he developed
in Liberty—arguments both prospective and retrospective. Lippmann
worried that the kinds of practices that had made “the manufacture
of consent” possible on an unprecedented scale during the war were
becoming normalized in peacetime. The CPI had recruited thousands
of cultural workers as volunteers to the government’s propaganda
effort: journalists, advertisers, illustrators, writers, actors, etc. New
forms of mass media—radio and film—had greatly amplified the
reach of their work. By 1920, the commercial potential of these new
media, and the enhanced persuasive techniques developed by CPI
staff and volunteers, were already being exploited by the private
sector.
Lippmann focused specifically on how the kinds of bias that had
distorted the Times coverage of the Russian Revolution were becom-
ing the postwar norm. He contended that the work of reporters had
become “confused with the work of preachers, revivalists, prophets
and agitators.” He added, “The current theory of American newspa-
perdom is that an abstraction like the truth and a grace like fairness
must be sacrificed whenever anyone thinks the necessities of civiliza-
tion require the sacrifice.” Lippmann specifically called out Adolph
Ochs, the owner of the New York Times, and Lord Northcliffe, a British
newspaper magnate and wartime director of propaganda, as news-
paper owners who “believe that edification is more important than
x
veracity. They believe it profoundly, violently, relentlessly. They preen
themselves upon it.”6 6 Lippmann, Liberty and the News, 2, 3.
Page references are to the mediastud-
ies.press edition.
Lippmann accused the men of putting “a painted screen where
there should be a window to the world.” Because democratic gover-
nance requires citizens to have access to truth, he accused both public
and private censors and propagandists of “attacking the foundations
of our constitutional system.” Lippmann, whose mentors included
the philosophers William James and George Santayana, was not naive
about the nature of truth: He recognized that in a secular age peo-
ple are “critically aware of how their purposes are special to their
age, their locality, their interests, and their limited knowledge.”7 He 7 Lippmann, Liberty, 3, 4.
would ultimately arrive at a Peircean conception of truth—although
some interpreters mistakenly impute a simplistic theory of journalis-
tic objectivity to him.8 According to Lippmann, the painted screens 8 Walter Lippmann, The Public Philos-
ophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1955). For Lippmann, as for Charles
Sanders Peirce, truth is socially con-
structed dialogically by a community
that shares common epistemological
standards. Through ongoing critique,
it gradually produces more reliable
knowledge over time.
have left the public “baffled because facts are not available; and they
are wondering whether government by consent can survive in a time
when the manufacture of consent is an unregulated private enter-
prise.” For, he contended, “in an exact sense the present crisis of
western democracy is a crisis in journalism.”9
9 Lippmann, Liberty, 1.
It is in this context that we can understand Lippmann’s distinctive
definition of liberty, which has puzzled many readers and interpreters
through the years. For Lippmann, liberty constitutes a method, not a
series of prohibitions and permissions: “Liberty is the name we give
to measures by which we protect and increase the veracity of the in-
formation upon which we act.” The critical purpose of Liberty and the
News, then, is to identify and examine specific political, sociological,
and technological obstacles (“censorships”) that undermine the verac-
ity of the information provided by the news. The book’s constructive
project means to identify and examine potential reforms—ethics,
policies, and practices—that may increase the reliability of the news.
Because, Lippmann concludes, “there can be no liberty for a commu-
nity which lacks the information by which to detect lies.”10 10 Lippmann, Liberty, 21, 20.
That conclusion appears as resonant in 2020 as it was in 1920.
Almost eerily so, as the prominent writer and journalism teacher
Roy Peter Clark testifies. He reports serendipitously coming across
a weathered copy of Liberty and the News in a library storage room.
This was his first encounter with the book, although he of course
knew Public Opinion. He prefaces his response to Liberty with an
unscholarly “Wow,” and describes the immediacy of its message
for the current plight of the press and the public. “In a single day,”
Clark writes, “I read the text, making notes about almost every page.
What I learned startled me, like discovering an ancient scroll meant
to be found a century into the future, unearthed just in time to rescue
civilization from catastrophe.”11 11 Roy Peter Clark, “Walter Lippmann
on Liberty and the News: A Century-
Old Mirror for our Troubled Times,”
Poynter, March 1, 2018.
L I B E R T Y A N D T H E N E W S
This page intentionally left blank
1 JOURNALISM AND THE HIGHER LAW
Volume 1, Number 1, of the first American newspaper was pub- doi | original pdf
lished in Boston on September 25, 1690. It was called Publick Occur-
rences. The second issue did not appear because the Governor and
Council suppressed it. They found that Benjamin Harris, the editor,
had printed “reflections of a very high nature.”1 Even to-day some 1 “History of American Journalism,”
James Melvin Lee, Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1917, p. 10.
of his reflections seem very high indeed. In his prospectus he had
written:
“That something may be done toward the Curing, or at least the
Charming of that Spirit of Lying, which prevails amongst us, wherefore
nothing shall be entered, but what we have reason to believe is true,
repairing to the best fountains for our Information. And when there
appears any material mistake in anything that is collected, it shall be
corrected in the next. Moreover, the Publisher of these Occurrences is
willing to engage, that whereas, there are many False Reports, mali-
ciously made, and spread among us, if any well-minded person will
be at the pains to trace any such false Report, so far as to find out and
Convict the First Raiser of it, he will in this Paper (unless just Advice
be given to the contrary) expose the Name of such Person, as A mali-
cious Raiser of a false Report. It is suppos’d that none will dislike this
Proposal, but such as intend to be guilty of so villainous a Crime.”
Everywhere to-day men are conscious that somehow they must
deal with questions more intricate than any that church or school
had prepared them to understand. Increasingly they know that they
cannot understand them if the facts are not quickly and steadily
available. Increasingly they are baffled because the facts are not avail-
able; and they are wondering whether government by consent can
survive in a time when the manufacture of consent is an unregulated
private enterprise. For in an exact sense the present crisis of western
democracy is a crisis in journalism.
I do not agree with those who think that the sole cause is corrup-
tion. There is plenty of corruption, to be sure, moneyed control, caste
pressure, financial and social bribery, ribbons, dinner parties, clubs,
petty politics. The speculators in Russian rubles who lied on the
Paris Bourse about the capture of Petrograd are not the only example
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of their species. And yet corruption does not explain the condition of
modern journalism.
Mr. Franklin P. Adams wrote recently: “Now there is much pettiness—
and almost incredible stupidity and ignorance—in the so-called free
press; but it is the pettiness, etc., common to the so-called human
race a pettiness found in musicians, steamfitters, landlords, poets,
and waiters. And when Miss Lowell [who had made the usual aris-
tocratic complaint] speaks of the incurable desire in all American
newspapers to make fun of everything in season and out, we quar-
rel again. There is an incurable desire in American newspapers to
take things much more seriously than they deserve. Does Miss Low-
ell read the ponderous news from Washington? Does she read the
society news? Does she, we wonder, read the newspapers?”
Mr. Adams does read them, and when he writes that the newspa-
pers take things much more seriously than they deserve, he has, as
the mayor’s wife remarked to the queen, said a mouthful. Since the
war, especially, editors have come to believe that their highest duty
is not to report but to instruct, not to print news but to save civiliza-
tion, not to publish what Benjamin Harris calls “the Circumstances
of Publique Affairs, both abroad and at home,” but to keep the na-
tion on the straight and narrow path. Like the Kings of England, they
have elected themselves Defenders of the Faith. “For five years,” says
Mr. Cobb of the New York World, “there has been no free play of pub-
lic opinion in the world. Confronted by the inexorable necessities of
war, governments conscripted public opinion. . . . They goose-stepped
it. They taught it to stand at attention and salute. . . . It sometimes
seems that after the armistice was signed, millions of Americans
must have taken a vow that they would never again do any thinking
for themselves. They were willing to die for their country, but not
willing to think for it.” That minority, which is proudly prepared to
think for it, and not only prepared, but cocksure that it alone knows
how to think for it, has adopted the theory that the public should
know what is good for it.
The work of reporters has thus become confused with the work of
preachers, revivalists, prophets and agitators. The current theory of
American newspaperdom is that an abstraction like the truth and a
grace like fairness must be sacrificed whenever anyone thinks the ne-
cessities of civilization require the sacrifice. To Archbishop Whately’s
dictum that it matters greatly whether you put truth in the first place
or the second, the candid expounder of modern journalism would re-
ply that he put truth second to what he conceived to be the national
interest. Judged simply by their product, men like Mr. Ochs or Vis-
count Northcliffe believe that their respective nations will perish and
civilization decay unless their idea of what is patriotic is permitted to
temper the curiosity of their readers.
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They believe that edification is more important than veracity. They
believe it profoundly, violently, relentlessly. They preen themselves
upon it. To patriotism, as they define it from day to day, all other
considerations must yield. That is their pride. And yet what is this
but one more among myriad examples of the doctrine that the end
justifies the means. A more insidiously misleading rule of conduct
was, I believe, never devised among men. It was a plausible rule as
long as men believed that an omniscient and benevolent Providence
taught them what end to seek. But now that men are critically aware
of how their purposes are special to their age, their locality, their
interests, and their limited knowledge, it is blazing arrogance to
sacrifice hard-won standards of credibility to some special purpose.
It is nothing but the doctrine that I want what I want when I want it.
Its monuments are the Inquisition and the invasion of Belgium. It is
the reason given for almost every act of unreason, the law invoked
whenever lawlessness justifies itself. At bottom it is nothing but the
anarchical nature of man imperiously hacking its way through.
Just as the most poisonous form of disorder is the mob incited
from high places, the most immoral act the immorality of a govern-
ment, so the most destructive form of untruth is sophistry and propa-
ganda by those whose profession it is to report the news. The news
columns are common carriers. When those who control them arro-
gate to themselves the right to determine by their own consciences
what shall be reported and for what purpose, democracy is unwork-
able. Public opinion is blockaded. For when a people can no longer
confidently repair ‘to the best fountains for their information,’ then
anyone’s guess and anyone’s rumor, each man’s hope and each man’s
whim becomes the basis of government. All that the sharpest crit-
ics of democracy have alleged is true, if there is no steady supply of
trustworthy and relevant news. Incompetence and aimlessness, cor-
ruption and disloyalty, panic and ultimate disaster, must come to any
people which is denied an assured access to the facts. No one can
manage anything on pap. Neither can a people.
Statesmen may devise policies; they will end in futility, as so many
have recently ended, if the propagandists and censors can put a
painted screen where there should be a window to the world. Few
episodes in recent history are more poignant than that of the British
Prime Minister, sitting at the breakfast table with that morning’s
paper before him protesting that he cannot do the sensible thing
in regard to Russia because a powerful newspaper proprietor has
drugged the public. That incident is a photograph of the supreme
danger which confronts popular government. All other dangers are
contingent upon it, for the news is the chief source of the opinion
by which government now proceeds. So long as there is interposed
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between the ordinary citizen and the facts a news organization de-
termining by entirely private and unexamined standards, no matter
how lofty, what he shall know, and hence what he shall believe, no
one will be able to say that the substance of democratic government
is secure. The theory of our constitution, says Mr. Justice Holmes, is
that truth is the only ground upon which men’s wishes safely can be
carried out.2 In so far as those who purvey the news make of their 2 Supreme Court of the United States,
No. 316, October term, 1919, Jacob
Abrams et al., Plaintiffs in Error vs. the
United States.
own beliefs a higher law than truth, they are attacking the founda-
tions of our constitutional system. There can be no higher law in
journalism than to tell the truth and shame the devil.
That I have few illusions as to the difficulty of truthful reporting
anyone can see who reads these pages. If truthfulness were simply a
matter of sincerity the future would be rather simple. But the modern
news problem is not solely a question of the newspaperman’s morals.
It is, as I have tried to show in what follows, the intricate result of a
civilization too extensive for any man’s personal observation. As the
problem is manifold, so must be the remedy. There is no panacea.
But however puzzling the matter may be, there are some things that
anyone may assert about it, and assert without fear of contradiction.
They are that there is a problem of the news which is of absolutely
basic importance to the survival of popular government, and that the
importance of that problem is not vividly realized nor sufficiently
considered.
In a few generations it will seem ludicrous to historians that a
people professing government by the will of the people should have
made no serious effort to guarantee the news without which a gov-
erning opinion cannot exist. “Is it possible,” they will ask, “that at
the beginning of the Twentieth Century nations calling themselves
democracies were content to act on what happened to drift across
their doorsteps; that apart from a few sporadic exposures and out-
cries they made no plans to bring these common carriers under social
control; that they provided no genuine training schools for the men
upon whose sagacity they were dependent; above all that their po-
litical scientists went on year after year writing and lecturing about
government without producing one, one single, significant study of
the process of public opinion?” And then they will recall the cen-
turies in which the Church enjoyed immunity from criticism, and
perhaps they will insist that the news structure of secular society was
not seriously examined for analogous reasons.
When they search into the personal records they will find that
among journalists, as among the clergy, institutionalism had induced
the usual prudence. I have made no criticism in this book which is
not the shoptalk of reporters and editors. But only rarely do news-
papermen take the general public into their confidence. They will
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have to sooner or later. It is not enough for them to struggle against
great odds, as many of them are doing, wearing out their souls to do
a particular assignment well. The philosophy of the work itself needs
to be discussed; the news about the news needs to be told. For the
news about the government of the news structure touches the center
of all modern government.
They need not be much concerned if leathery-minded individuals
ask What is Truth of all who plead for the effort of truth in modern
journalism. Jesting Pilate asked the same question, and he also would
not stay for an answer. No doubt an organon of news reporting must
wait upon the development of psychology and political science. But
resistance to the inertias of the profession, heresy to the institution,
and the willingness to be fired rather than write what you do not
believe, these wait on nothing but personal courage. And without
the assistance which they will bring from within the profession itself,
democracy through [sic] it will deal with the problem somehow, will
deal with it badly.
The essays which follow are an attempt to describe the character of
the problem, and to indicate headings under which it may be found
useful to look for remedies.
This page intentionally left blank
2 WHAT MODERN LIBERTY MEANS
From our recent experience it is clear that the traditional liberties doi | original pdf
of speech and opinion rest on no solid foundation. At a time when
the world needs above all other things the activity of generous imag-
inations and the creative leadership of planning and inventive minds,
our thinking is shriveled with panic. Time and energy that should
go to building and restoring are instead consumed in warding off
the pin-pricks of prejudice and fighting a guerilla war against mis-
understanding and intolerance. For suppression is felt, not simply
by the scattered individuals who are actually suppressed. It reaches
back into the steadiest minds, creating tension everywhere; and the
tension of fear produces sterility. Men cease to say what they think;
and when they cease to say it, they soon cease to think it. They think
in reference to their critics and not in reference to the facts. For when
thought becomes socially hazardous, men spend more time wonder-
ing about the hazard than they do in cultivating their thought. Yet
nothing is more certain than that mere bold resistance will not per-
manently liberate men’s minds. The problem is not only greater than
that, but different, and the time is ripe for reconsideration. We have
learned that many of the hard-won rights of man are utterly insecure.
It may be that we cannot make them secure simply by imitating the
earlier champions of liberty.
Something important about the human character was exposed
by Plato when, with the spectacle of Socrates’s death before him, he
founded Utopia on a censorship stricter than any which exists on
this heavily censored planet. His intolerance seems strange. But it
is really the logical expression of an impulse that most of us have
not the candor to recognize. It was the service of Plato to formulate
the dispositions of men in the shape of ideals, and the surest things
we can learn from him are not what we ought to do, but what we
are inclined to do. We are peculiarly inclined to suppress whatever
impugns the security of that to which we have given our allegiance.
If our loyalty is turned to what exists, intolerance begins at its fron-
tiers; if it is turned, as Plato’s was, to Utopia, we shall find Utopia
defended with intolerance.
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There are, so far as I can discover, no absolutists of liberty; I can
recall no doctrine of liberty, which, under the acid test, does not
become contingent upon some other ideal. The goal is never liberty,
but liberty for something or other. For liberty is a condition under
which activity takes place, and men’s interests attach themselves
primarily to their activities and what is necessary to fulfill them, not
to the abstract requirements of any activity that might be conceived.
And yet controversialists rarely take this into account. The battle
is fought with banners on which are inscribed absolute and univer-
sal ideals. They are not absolute and universal in fact. No man has
ever thought out an absolute or a universal ideal in politics, for the
simple reason that nobody knows enough, or can know enough, to
do it. But we all use absolutes, because an ideal which seems to ex-
ist apart from time, space, and circumstance has a prestige that no
candid avowal of special purpose can ever have. Looked at from one
point of view universals are part of the fighting apparatus in men.
What they desire enormously they easily come to call God’s will, or
their nation’s purpose. Looked at genetically, these idealizations are
probably born in that spiritual reverie where all men live most of the
time. In reverie there is neither time, space, nor particular reference,
and hope is omnipotent. This omnipotence, which is denied to them
in action, nevertheless illuminates activity with a sense of utter and
irresistible value.
The classic doctrine of liberty consists of absolutes. It consists of
them except at the critical points where the author has come into
contact with objective difficulties. Then he introduces into the argu-
ment, somewhat furtively, a reservation which liquidates its universal
meaning and reduces the exalted plea for liberty in general to a spe-
cial argument for the success of a special purpose.
There are at the present time, for instance, no more fervent cham-
pions of liberty than the western sympathizers with the Russian So-
viet government. Why is it that they are indignant when Mr. Burleson
suppresses a newspaper and complacent when Lenin does? And, vice
versa, why is it that the anti-Bolshevist forces in the world are in favor
of restricting constitutional liberty as a preliminary to establishing
genuine liberty in Russia? Clearly the argument about liberty has lit-
tle actual relation to the existence of it. It is the purpose of the social
conflict, not the freedom of opinion, that lies close to the heart of the
partisans. The word liberty is a weapon and an advertisement, but
certainly not an ideal which transcends all special aims.
If there were any man who believed in liberty apart from partic-
ular purposes, that man would be a hermit contemplating all exis-
tence with a hopeful and neutral eye. For him, in the last analysis,
there could be nothing worth resisting, nothing particularly worth
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attaining, nothing particularly worth defending, not even the right
of hermits to contemplate existence with a cold and neutral eye. He
would be loyal simply to the possibilities of the human spirit, even
to those possibilities which most seriously impair its variety and its
health. No such man has yet counted much in the history of politics.
For what every theorist of liberty has meant is that certain types of
behavior and classes of opinion hitherto regulated should be some-
what differently regulated in the future. What each seems to say is
that opinion and action should be free; that liberty is the highest and
most sacred interest of life. But somewhere each of them inserts a
weasel clause to the effect that “of course” the freedom granted shall
not be employed too destructively. It is this clause which checks exu-
berance and reminds us that, in spite of appearances, we are listening
to finite men pleading a special cause.
Among the English classics none are more representative than
Milton’s Areopagitica and the essay On Liberty by John Stuart Mill. Of
living men Mr. Bertrand Russell is perhaps the most outstanding ad-
vocate of liberty. The three together are a formidable set of witnesses.
Yet nothing is easier than to draw texts from each which can be cited
either as an argument for absolute liberty or as an excuse for as much
repression as seems desirable at the moment. Says Milton:
Yet if all cannot be of one mind, as who looks they should be? this
doubtles is more wholsome, more prudent, and more Christian that
many be tolerated, rather than all compell’d.
So much for the generalization. Now for the qualification which
follows immediately upon it.
I mean not tolerated Popery, and open superstition, which as it extir-
pats all religions and civill supremacies, so itself should be extirpat,
provided first that all charitable and compassionat means be used to
win and regain the weak and misled: that also which is impious or evil
absolutely either against faith or maners no law can possibly permit,
that intends not to unlaw it self: but those neighboring differences,
or rather indifferences, are what I speak of, whether in some point of
doctrine or of discipline, which though they may be many, yet need not
interrupt the unity of spirit, if we could but find among us the bond of
peace.
With this as a text one could set up an inquisition. Yet it occurs in
the noblest plea for liberty that exists in the English language. The
critical point in Milton’s thought is revealed by the word “indiffer-
ences.” The area of opinion which he wished to free comprised the
“neighboring differences” of certain Protestant sects, and only these
where they were truly ineffective in manners and morals. Milton, in
short, had come to the conclusion that certain conflicts of doctrine
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were sufficiently insignificant to be tolerated. The conclusion de-
pended far less upon his notion of the value of liberty than upon his
conception of God and human nature and the England of his time.
He urged indifference to things that were becoming indifferent.
If we substitute the word indifference for the word liberty, we shall
come much closer to the real intention that lies behind the classic ar-
gument. Liberty is to be permitted where differences are of no great
moment. It is this definition which has generally guided practice.
In times when men feel themselves secure, heresy is cultivated as
the spice of life. During a war liberty disappears as the community
feels itself menaced. When revolution seems to be contagious, heresy-
hunting is a respectable occupation. In other words, when men are
not afraid, they are not afraid of ideas; when they are much afraid,
they are afraid of anything that seems, or can even be made to ap-
pear, seditious. That is why nine-tenths of the effort to live and let
live consists in proving that the thing we wish to have tolerated is
really a matter of indifference.
In Mill this truth reveals itself still more clearly. Though his argu-
ment is surer and completer than Milton’s, the qualification is also
surer and completer.
Such being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings
should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions with-
out reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual
and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is ei-
ther conceded or asserted in spite of prohibition, let us next examine
whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to
act upon their opinions, to carry these out in their lives, without hin-
drance, either moral or physical, from their fellow men, so long as it
is at their own risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable.
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions. On the con-
trary, even opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive
instigation to some mischievous act.
“At their own risk and peril.” In other words, at the risk of eternal
damnation. The premise from which Mill argued was that many
opinions then under the ban of society were of no interest to society,
and ought therefore not to be interfered with. The orthodoxy with
which he was at war was chiefly theocratic. It assumed that a man’s
opinions on cosmic affairs might endanger his personal salvation
and make him a dangerous member of society. Mill did not believe
in the theological view, did not fear damnation, and was convinced
that morality did not depend upon the religious sanction. In fact,
he was convinced that a more reasoned morality could be formed
by laying aside theological assumptions. “But no one pretends that
actions should be as free as opinions.” The plain truth is that Mill did
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not believe that much action would result from the toleration of those
opinions in which he was most interested.
Political heresy occupied the fringe of his attention, and he uttered
only the most casual comments. So incidental are they, so little do
they impinge on his mind, that the arguments of this staunch apos-
tle of liberty can be used honestly, and in fact are used, to justify
the bulk of the suppressions which have recently occurred. “Even
opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which they
are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive in-
stigation to some mischievious act.” Clearly there is no escape here
for Debs or Haywood or obstructors of Liberty Loans. The argu-
ment used is exactly the one employed in sustaining the conviction of
Debs.
In corroboration Mill’s single concrete instance may be cited: “An
opinion that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private
property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated
through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered
orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer,
or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a plac-
ard.”
Clearly Mill’s theory of liberty wore a different complexion when
he considered opinions which might directly affect social order.
Where the stimulus of opinion upon action was effective he could
say with entire complacency, “The liberty of the individual must be
thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other peo-
ple.” Because Mill believed this, it is entirely just to infer that the
distinction drawn between a speech or placard and publication in the
press would soon have broken down for Mill had he lived at a time
when the press really circulated and the art of type-display had made
a newspaper strangely like a placard.
On first acquaintance no man would seem to go further than
Mr. Bertrand Russell in loyalty to what he calls “the unfettered de-
velopment of all the instincts that build up life and fill it with mental
delights.” He calls these instincts “creative”; and against them he sets
off the “possessive impulses.” These, he says, should be restricted by
“a public authority, a repository of practically irresistible force whose
function should be primarily to repress the private use of force.”
Where Milton said no “tolerated Popery,” Mr. Russell says, no toler-
ated “possessive impulses.” Surely he is open to the criticism that,
like every authoritarian who has preceded him, he is interested in the
unfettered development of only that which seems good to him. Those
who think that “enlightened selfishness” produces social harmony
will tolerate more of the possessive impulses, and will be inclined to
put certain of Mr. Russell’s creative impulses under lock and key.
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The moral is, not that Milton, Mill, and Bertrand Russell are in-
consistent, or that liberty is to be obtained by arguing for it without
qualifications. The impulse to what we call liberty is as strong in
these three men as it is ever likely to be in our society. The moral is
of another kind. It is that the traditional core of liberty, namely, the
notion of indifference, is too feeble and unreal a doctrine to protect
the purpose of liberty, which is the furnishing of a healthy environ-
ment in which human judgment and inquiry can most successfully
organize human life. Too feeble, because in time of stress nothing
is easier than to insist, and by insistence to convince, that tolerated
indifference is no longer tolerable because it has ceased to be indiffer-
ent.
It is clear that in a society where public opinion has become deci-
sive, nothing that counts in the formation of it can really be a matter
of indifference. When I say “can be,” I am speaking literally. What
men believed about the constitution of heaven became a matter of
indifference when heaven disappeared in metaphysics; but what
they believe about property, government, conscription, taxation, the
origins of the late war, or the origins of the Franco-Prussian War,
or the distribution of Latin culture in the vicinity of copper mines,
constitutes the difference between life and death, prosperity and mis-
fortune, and it will never on this earth be tolerated as indifferent, or
not interfered with, no matter how many noble arguments are made
for liberty, or how many martyrs give their lives for it. If widespread
tolerance of opposing views is to be achieved in modern society, it
will not be simply by fighting the Debs’ cases through the courts, and
certainly not by threatening to upset those courts if they do not yield
to the agitation. The task is fundamentally of another order, requiring
other methods and other theories.
The world about which each man is supposed to have opinions
has become so complicated as to defy his powers of understand-
ing. What he knows of events that matter enormously to him, the
purposes of governments, the aspirations of peoples, the struggle of
classes, he knows at second, third, or fourth hand. He cannot go and
see for himself. Even the things that are near to him have become
too involved for his judgment. I know of no man, even among those
who devote all of their time to watching public affairs, who can even
pretend to keep track, at the same time, of his city government, his
state government, Congress, the departments, the industrial situation,
and the rest of the world. What men who make the study of politics
a vocation cannot do, the man who has an hour a day for newspapers
and talk cannot possibly hope to do. He must seize catchwords and
headlines or nothing.
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This vast elaboration of the subject-matter of politics is the root
of the whole problem. News comes from a distance; it comes helter-
skelter, in inconceivable confusion; it deals with matters that are not
easily understood; it arrives and is assimilated by busy and tired peo-
ple who must take what is given to them. Any lawyer with a sense
of evidence knows how unreliable such information must necessarily
be.
The taking of testimony in a trial is hedged about with a thou-
sand precautions derived from long experience of the fallibility of
the witness and the prejudices of the jury. We call this, and rightly, a
fundamental phase of human liberty. But in public affairs the stake is
infinitely greater. It involves the lives of millions, and the fortune of
everybody. The jury is the whole community, not even the qualified
voters alone. The jury is everybody who creates public sentiment—
chattering gossips, unscrupulous liars, congenital liars, feeble-minded
people, prostitute minds, corrupting agents. To this jury any testi-
mony is submitted, is submitted in any form, by any anonymous
person, with no test of reliability, no test of credibility, and no penalty
for perjury. If I lie in a lawsuit involving the fate of my neighbor’s
cow, I can go to jail. But if I lie to a million readers in a matter involv-
ing war and peace, I can lie my head off, and, if I choose the right
series of lies, be entirely irresponsible. Nobody will punish me if I lie
about Japan, for example. I can announce that every Japanese valet
is a reservist, and every Japanese art store a mobilization center. I
am immune. And if there should be hostilities with Japan, the more
I lied the more popular I should be. If I asserted that the Japanese
secretly drank the blood of children, that Japanese women were un-
chaste, that the Japanese were really not a branch of the human race
after all, I guarantee that most of the newspapers would print it ea-
gerly, and that I could get a hearing in churches all over the country.
And all this for the simple reason that the public, when it is depen-
dent on testimony and protected by no rules of evidence, can act only
on the excitement of its pugnacities and its hopes.
The mechanism of the news-supply has developed without plan,
and there is no one point in it at which one can fix the responsibility
for truth. The fact is that the subdivision of labor is now accompa-
nied by the subdivision of the news-organization. At one end of it
is the eye-witness, at the other, the reader. Between the two is a vast,
expensive transmitting and editing apparatus. This machine works
marvelously well at times, particularly in the rapidity with which it
can report the score of a game or a transatlantic flight, or the death
of a monarch, or the result of an election. But where the issue is com-
plex, as for example in the matter of the success of a policy, or the
social conditions among a foreign people,—that is to say, where the
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real answer is neither yes or no, but subtle, and a matter of balanced
evidence,—the subdivision of the labor involved in the report causes
no end of derangement, misunderstanding, and even misrepresenta-
tion.
Thus the number of eye-witnesses capable of honest statement
is inadequate and accidental. Yet the reporter making up his news
is dependent upon the eye-witnesses. They may be actors in the
event. Then they can hardly be expected to have perspective. Who,
for example, if he put aside his own likes and dislikes would trust
a Bolshevik’s account of what exists in Soviet Russia or an exiled
Russian prince’s story of what exists in Siberia? Sitting just across
the frontier, say in Stockholm, how is a reporter to write dependable
news when his witnesses consist of emigrés or Bolshevist agents?
At the Peace Conference, news was given out by the agents of the
conferees and the rest leaked through those who were clamoring at
the doors of the Conference. Now the reporter, if he is to earn his
living, must nurse his personal contacts with the eye-witnesses and
privileged informants. If he is openly hostile to those in authority,
he will cease to be a reporter unless there is an opposition party in
the inner circle who can feed him news. Failing that, he will know
precious little of what is going on.
Most people seem to believe that, when they meet a war corre-
spondent or a special writer from the Peace Conference, they have
seen a man who has seen the things he wrote about. Far from it. No-
body, for example, saw this war. Neither the men in the trenches nor
the commanding, general. The men saw their trenches, their billets,
sometimes they saw an enemy trench, but nobody, unless it be the
aviators, saw a battle. What the correspondents saw, occasionally,
was the terrain over which a battle had been fought; but what they
reported day by day was what they were told at press headquarters,
and of that only what they were allowed to tell.
At the Peace Conference the reporters were allowed to meet pe-
riodically the four least important members of the Commission,
men who themselves had considerable difficulty in keeping track of
things, as any reporter who was present will testify. This was supple-
mented by spasmodic personal interviews with the commissioners,
their secretaries, their secretaries’ secretaries, other newspaper men,
and confidential representatives of the President, who stood between
him and the impertinences of curiosity. This and the French press,
than which there is nothing more censored and inspired, a local En-
glish trade-journal of the expatriates, the gossip of the Crillon lobby,
the Majestic, and the other official hotels, constituted the source of
the news upon which American editors and the American people
have had to base one of the most difficult judgments of their history.
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I should perhaps add that there were a few correspondents occu-
pying privileged positions with foreign governments. They wore
ribbons in their button-holes to prove it. They were in many ways
the most useful correspondents because they always revealed to the
trained reader just what it was that their governments wished Amer-
ica to believe.
The news accumulated by the reporter from his witnesses has to
be selected, if for no other reason than that the cable facilities are lim-
ited. At the cable office several varieties of censorship intervene. The
legal censorship in Europe is political as well as military, and both
words are elastic. It has been applied, not only to the substance of
the news, but to the mode of presentation, and even to the character
of the type and the position on the page. But the real censorship on
the wires is the cost of transmission. This in itself is enough to limit
any expensive competition or any significant independence. The big
Continental news agencies are subsidized. Censorship operates also
through congestion and the resultant need of a system of priority.
Congestion makes possible good and bad service, and undesirable
messages are not infrequently served badly.
When the report does reach the editor, another series of interven-
tions occurs. The editor is a man who may know all about some-
thing, but he can hardly be expected to know all about everything.
Yet he has to decide the question which is of more importance than
any other in the formation of opinions, the question where attention
is to be directed. In a newspaper the heads are the foci of attention,
the odd corners the fringe; and whether one aspect of the news or
another appears in the center or at the periphery makes all the differ-
ence in the world. The news of the day as it reaches the newspaper
office is an incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion,
clues, hopes, and fears, and the task of selecting and ordering that
news is one of the truly sacred and priestly offices in a democracy.
For the newspaper is in all literalness the bible of democracy, the
book out of which a people determines its conduct. It is the only
serious book most people read. It is the only book they read every
day. Now the power to determine each day what shall seem impor-
tant and what shall be neglected is a power unlike any that has been
exercised since the Pope lost his hold on the secular mind.
The ordering is not done by one man, but by a host of men, who
are on the whole curiously unanimous in their selection and in their
emphasis. Once you know the party and social affiliations of a news-
paper, you can predict with considerable certainty the perspective in
which the news will be displayed. This perspective is by no means
altogether deliberate. Though the editor is ever so much more sophis-
ticated than all but a minority of his readers, his own sense of relative
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importance is determined by rather standardized constellations of
ideas. He very soon comes to believe that his habitual emphasis is the
only possible one.
Why the editor is possessed by a particular set of ideas is a dif-
ficult question in social psychology, of which no adequate analysis
has been made. But we shall not be far wrong if we say that he deals
with the news in reference to the prevailing mores of his social group.
These mores are of course in a large measure the product of what
previous newspapers have said; and experience shows that, in order
to break out of this circle, it has been necessary at various times to
create new forms of journalism, such as the national monthly, the
critical weekly, the circular, the paid advertisements of ideas, in order
to change the emphasis which had become obsolete and habit-ridden.
Into this extremely refractory, and I think increasingly disservice-
able mechanism, there has been thrown, especially since the outbreak
of war, another monkey-wrench—propaganda. The word, of course,
covers a multitude of sins and a few virtues. The virtues can be easily
separated out, and given another name, either advertisement or ad-
vocacy. Thus, if the National Council of Belgravia wishes to publish
a magazine out of its own funds, under its own imprint, advocat-
ing the annexation of Thrums, no one will object. But if, in support
of that advocacy, it gives to the press stories that are lies about the
atrocities committed in Thrums; or, worse still, if those stories seem
to come from Geneva, or Amsterdam, not from the press-service
of the National Council of Belgravia, then Belgravia is conducting
propaganda. If, after arousing a certain amount of interest in itself,
Belgravia then invites a carefully selected correspondent, or perhaps
a labor leader, to its capital, puts him up at the best hotel, rides him
around in limousines, fawns on him at banquets, lunches with him
very confidentially, and then puts him through a conducted tour so
that he shall see just what will create the desired impression, then
again Belgravia is conducting propaganda. Or if Belgravia happens
to possess the greatest trombone-player in the world, and if she sends
him over to charm the wives of influential husbands, Belgravia is,
in a less objectionable way, perhaps, committing propaganda, and
making fools of the husbands.
Now, the plain fact is that out of the troubled areas of the world
the public receives practically nothing that is not propaganda. Lenin
and his enemies control all the news there is of Russia, and no court
of law would accept any of the testimony as valid in a suit to deter-
mine the possession of a donkey. I am writing many months after
the Armistice. The Senate is at this moment engaged in debating the
question whether it will guarantee the frontiers of Poland; but what
we learn of Poland we learn from the Polish Government and the
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Jewish Committee. Judgment on the vexed issues of Europe is simply
out of the question for the average American; and the more cocksure
he is, the more certainly is he the victim of some propaganda.
These instances are drawn from foreign affairs, but the difficulty
at home, although less flagrant, is nevertheless real. Theodore Roo-
sevelt, and Leonard Wood after him, have told us to think nationally.
It is not easy. It is easy to parrot what those people say who live in
a few big cities and who have constituted themselves the only true
and authentic voice of America. But beyond that it is difficult. I live
in New York and I have not the vaguest idea what Brooklyn is in-
terested in. It is possible, with effort, much more effort than most
people can afford to give, for me to know what a few organized bod-
ies like the Non-Partisan League, the National Security League, the
American Federation of Labor, and the Republican National Com-
mittee are up to; but what the unorganized workers, and the unorga-
nized farmers, the shopkeepers, the local bankers and boards of trade
are thinking and feeling, no one has any means of knowing, except
perhaps in a vague way at election time. To think nationally means,
at least, to take into account the major interests and needs and de-
sires of this continental population; and for that each man would
need a staff of secretaries, traveling agents, and a very expensive
press-clipping bureau.
We do not think nationally because the facts that count are not
systematically reported and presented in a form we can digest. Our
most abysmal ignorance occurs where we deal with the immigrant.
If we read his press at all, it is to discover “Bolshevism” in it and to
blacken all immigrants with suspicion. For his culture and his aspi-
rations, for his high gifts of hope and variety, we have neither eyes
nor ears. The immigrant colonies are like holes in the road which we
never notice until we trip over them. Then, because we have no cur-
rent information and no background of facts, we are, of course, the
undiscriminating objects of any agitator who chooses to rant against
“foreigners.”
Now, men who have lost their grip upon the relevant facts of their
environment are the inevitable victims of agitation and propaganda.
The quack, the charlatan, the jingo, and the terrorist, can flourish
only where the audience is deprived of independent access to in-
formation. But where all news comes at second-hand, where all the
testimony is uncertain, men cease to respond to truths, and respond
simply to opinions. The environment in which they act is not the re-
alities themselves, but the pseudo-environment of reports, rumors,
and guesses. The whole reference of thought comes to be what some-
body asserts, not what actually is. Men ask, not whether such and
such a thing occurred in Russia, but whether Mr. Raymond Robins
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is at heart more friendly to the Bolsheviki than Mr. Jerome Land-
field. And so, since they are deprived of any trustworthy means of
knowing what is really going on, since everything is on the plane of
assertion and propaganda, they believe whatever fits most comfort-
ably with their prepossessions.
That this breakdown of the means of public knowledge should
occur at a time of immense change is a compounding of the difficulty.
From bewilderment to panic is a short step, as everyone knows who
has watched a crowd when danger threatens. At the present time a
nation easily acts like a crowd. Under the influence of headlines and
panicky print, the contagion of unreason can easily spread through a
settled community. For when the comparatively recent and unstable
nervous organization which makes us capable of responding to real-
ity as it is, and not as we should wish it, is baffled over a continuing
period of time, the more primitive but much stronger instincts are let
loose.
War and Revolution, both of them founded on censorship and pro-
paganda, are the supreme destroyers of realistic thinking, because the
excess of danger and the fearful overstimulation of passion unsettle
disciplined behavior. Both breed fanatics of all kinds, men who, in
the words of Mr. Santayana, have redoubled their effort when they
have forgotten their aim. The effort itself has become the aim. Men
live in their effort, and for a time find great exaltation. They seek
stimulation of their effort rather than direction of it. That is why
both in war and revolution there seems to operate a kind of Gre-
sham’s Law of the emotions, in which leadership passes by a swift
degradation from a Mirabeau to a Robespierre; and in war, from a
high-minded statesmanship to the depths of virulent, hating jingo-
ism.
The cardinal fact always is the loss of contact with objective infor-
mation. Public as well as private reason depends upon it. Not what
somebody says, not what somebody wishes were true, but what is so
beyond all our opining, constitutes the touchstone of our sanity. And
a society which lives at second-hand will commit incredible follies
and countenance inconceivable brutalities if that contact is intermit-
tent and untrustworthy. Demagoguery is a parasite that flourishes
where discrimination fails, and only those who are at grips with
things themselves are impervious to it. For, in the last analysis, the
demagogue, whether of the Right or the Left, is, consciously or un-
consciously an undetected liar.
Many students of politics have concluded that, because public
opinion was unstable, the remedy lay in making government as inde-
pendent of it as possible. The theorists of representative government
have argued persistently from this premise against the believers in
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direct legislation. But it appears now that, while they have been mak-
ing their case against direct legislation, rather successfully it seems
to me, they have failed sufficiently to notice the increasing malady of
representative government.
Parliamentary action is becoming notoriously ineffective. In Amer-
ica certainly the concentration of power in the Executive is out of
all proportion either to the intentions of the Fathers or to the ortho-
dox theory of representative government. The cause is fairly clear.
Congress is an assemblage of men selected for local reasons from
districts. It brings to Washington a more or less accurate sense of the
superficial desires of its constituency. In Washington it is supposed to
think nationally and internationally. But for that task its equipment
and its sources of information are hardly better than that of any other
reader of the newspaper. Except for its spasmodic investigating com-
mittees, Congress has no particular way of informing itself. But the
Executive has. The Executive is an elaborate hierarchy reaching to
every part of the nation and to all parts of the world. It has an inde-
pendent machinery, fallible and not too truthworthy, of course, but
nevertheless a machinery of intelligence. It can be informed and it
can act, whereas Congress is not informed and cannot act.
Now the popular theory of representative government is that
the representatives have the information and therefore create the
policy which the executive administers. The more subtle theory is
that the executive initiates the policy which the legislature corrects
in accordance with popular wisdom. But when the legislature is
haphazardly informed, this amounts to very little, and the people
themselves prefer to trust the executive which knows, rather than
the Congress which is vainly trying to know. The result has been
the development of a kind of government which has been harshly
described as plébiscite autocracy, or government by newspapers.
Decisions in the modern state tend to be made by the interaction,
not of Congress and the executive, but of public opinion and the
executive.
Public opinion for this purpose finds itself collected about special
groups which act as extra-legal organs of government. There is a
labor nucleus, a farmers’ nucleus, a prohibition nucleus, a National
Security League nucleus, and so on. These groups conduct a contin-
ual electioneering campaign upon the unformed, exploitable mass
of public opinion. Being special groups, they have special sources of
information, and what they lack in the way of information is often
manufactured. These conflicting pressures beat upon the executive
departments and upon Congress, and formulate the conduct of the
government. The government itself acts in reference to these groups
far more than in reference to the district congressmen. So politics as
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it is now played consists in coercing and seducing the representative
by the threat and the appeal of these unofficial groups. Sometimes
they are the allies, sometimes the enemies, of the party in power, but
more and more they are the energy of public affairs. Government
tends to operate by the impact of controlled opinion upon adminis-
tration. This shift in the locus of sovereignty has placed a premium
upon the manufacture of what is usually called consent. No wonder
that the most powerful newspaper proprietor in the English-speaking
world declined a mere government post.
No wonder, too, that the protection of the sources of its opinion
is the basic problem of democracy. Everything else depends upon it.
Without protection against propaganda, without standards of evi-
dence, without criteria of emphasis, the living substance of all popu-
lar decision is exposed to every prejudice and to infinite exploitation.
That is why I have argued that the older doctrine of liberty was mis-
leading. It did not assume a public opinion that governs. Essentially
it demanded toleration of opinions that were, as Milton said, indif-
ferent. It can guide us little in a world where opinion is sensitive and
decisive.
The axis of the controversy needs to be shifted. The attempt to
draw fine distinctions between “liberty” and “license” is no doubt
part of the day’s work, but it is fundamentally a negative part. It
consists in trying to make opinion responsible to prevailing social
standards, whereas the really important thing is to try and make
opinion increasingly responsible to the facts. There can be no liberty
for a community which lacks the information by which to detect lies.
Trite as the conclusion may at first seem, it has, I believe, immense
practical consequences, and may perhaps offer an escape from the
logomachy into which the contests of liberty so easily degenerate.
It may be bad to suppress a particular opinion, but the really
deadly thing is to suppress the news. In time of great insecurity,
certain opinions acting on unstable minds may cause infinite dis-
aster. Knowing that such opinions necessarily originate in slender
evidence, that they are propelled more by prejudice from the rear
than by reference to realities, it seems to me that to build the case for
liberty upon the dogma of their unlimited prerogatives is to build
it upon the poorest foundation. For, even though we grant that the
world is best served by the liberty of all opinion, the plain fact is
that men are too busy and too much concerned to fight more than
spasmodically for such liberty. When freedom of opinion is revealed
as freedom of error, illusion, and misinterpretation, it is virtually
impossible to stir up much interest in its behalf. It is the thinnest of
all abstractions and an over-refinement of mere intellectualism. But
people, wide circles of people, are aroused when their curiosity is
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baulked. The desire to know, the dislike of being deceived and made
game of, is a really powerful motive, and it is that motive that can
best be enlisted in the cause of freedom.
What, for example, was the one most general criticism of the work
of the Peace Conference? It was that the covenants were not openly
arrived at. This fact stirred Republican Senators, British Labor, the
whole gamut of parties from the Right to the Left. And in the last
analysis lack of information about the Conference was the origin of its
difficulties. Because of the secrecy endless suspicion was aroused; be-
cause of it the world seemed to be presented with a series of accom-
plished facts which it could not reject and did not wish altogether
to accept. It was lack of information which kept public opinion from
affecting the negotiations at the time when intervention would have
counted most and cost least. Publicity occurred when the covenants
were arrived at, with all the emphasis on the at. This is what the Sen-
ate objected to, and this is what alienated much more liberal opinion
than the Senate represents.
In a passage quoted previously in this essay, Milton said that dif-
ferences of opinion, “which though they may be many, yet need not
interrupt the unity of spirit, if we could but find among us the bond
of peace.” There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as di-
verse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than of aim; the unity
of the disciplined experiment. There is but one bond of peace that
is both permanent and enriching: the increasing knowledge of the
world in which experiment occurs. With a common intellectual
method and a common area of valid fact, differences may become
a form of cooperation and cease to be an irreconcilable antagonism.
That, I think, constitutes the meaning of freedom for us. We can-
not successfully define liberty, or accomplish it, by a series of permis-
sions and prohibitions. For that is to ignore the content of opinion
in favor of its form. Above all, it is an attempt to define liberty of
opinion in terms of opinion. It is a circular and sterile logic. A use-
ful definition of liberty is obtainable only by seeking the principle of
liberty in the main business of human life, that is to say, in the pro-
cess by which men educate their response and learn to control their
environment. In this view liberty is the name we give to measures by
which we protect and increase the veracity of the information upon
which we act.
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The debates about liberty have hitherto all been attempts to de- doi | original pdf
termine just when in the series from Right to Left the censorship
should intervene. In the preceding paper I ventured to ask whether
these attempts do not turn on a misconception of the problem. The
conclusion reached was that, in dealing with liberty of opinion, we
were dealing with a subsidiary phase of the whole matter; that, so
long as we were content to argue about the privileges and immuni-
ties of opinion, we were missing the point and trying to make bricks
without straw. We should never succeed even in fixing a standard
of tolerance for opinions, if we concentrated all our attention on the
opinions. For they are derived, not necessarily by reason, to be sure,
but somehow, from the stream of news that reaches the public, and
the protection of that stream is the critical interest in a modern state.
In going behind opinion to the information which it exploits, and in
making the validity of the news our ideal, we shall be fighting the
battle where it is really being fought. We shall be protecting for the
public interest that which all the special interests in the world are
most anxious to corrupt.
As the sources of the news are protected, as the information they
furnish becomes accessible and usable, as our capacity to read that
information is educated, the old problem of tolerance will wear a
new aspect. Many questions which seem hopelessly insoluble now
will cease to seem important enough to be worth solving. Thus the
advocates of a larger freedom always argue that true opinions will
prevail over error; their opponents always claim that you can fool
most of the people most of the time. Both statements are true, but
both are half-truths. True opinions can prevail only if the facts to
which they refer are known; if they are not known, false ideas are just
as effective as true ones, if not a little more effective.
The sensible procedure in matters affecting the liberty of opin-
ion would be to ensure as impartial an investigation of the facts as
is humanly possible. But it is just this investigation that is denied
us. It is denied us, because we are dependent upon the testimony
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of anonymous and untrained and prejudiced witnesses; because the
complexity of the relevant facts is beyond the scope of our hurried
understanding; and finally, because the process we call education
fails so lamentably to educate the sense of evidence or the power of
penetrating to the controlling center of a situation. The task of liberty,
therefore, falls roughly under three heads, protection of the sources
of the news, organization of the news so as to make it comprehensi-
ble, and education of human response.
We need, first, to know what can be done with the existing news-
structure, in order to correct its grosser evils. How far is it useful
to go in fixing personal responsibility for the truthfulness of news?
Much further, I am inclined to think, than we have ever gone. We
ought to know the names of the whole staff of every periodical.
While it is not necessary, or even desirable, that each article should be
signed, each article should be documented, and false documentation
should be illegal. An item of news should always state whether it is
received from one of the great news-agencies, or from a reporter, or
from a press bureau. Particular emphasis should be put on marking
news supplied by press bureaus, whether they are labeled “Geneva,”
or “Stockholm,” or “El Paso.”
One wonders next whether anything can be devised to meet that
great evil of the press, the lie which, once under way, can never be
tracked down. The more scrupulous papers will, of course, print a
retraction when they have unintentionally injured someone; but the
retraction rarely compensates the victim. The law of libel is a clumsy
and expensive instrument, and rather useless to private individuals
or weak organizations because of the gentlemen’s agreement which
obtains in the newspaper world. After all, the remedy for libel is not
money damages, but an undoing of the injury. Would it be possi-
ble then to establish courts of honor in which publishers should be
compelled to meet their accusers and, if found guilty of misrepre-
sentation, ordered to publish the correction in the particular form
and with the prominence specified by the finding of the court? I do
not know. Such courts might prove to be a great nuisance, consum-
ing time and energy and attention, and offering too free a field for
individuals with a persecution mania.
Perhaps a procedure could be devised which would eliminate
most of these inconveniences. Certainly it would be a great gain if
the accountability of publishers could be increased. They exercise
more power over the individual than is healthy, as everybody knows
who has watched the yellow press snooping at keyholes and invad-
ing the privacy of helpless men and women. Even more important
than this, is the utterly reckless power of the press in dealing with
news vitally affecting the friendship of peoples. In a Court of Honor,
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possible perhaps only in Utopia, voluntary associations working for
decent relations with other peoples might hale the jingo and the sub-
tle propagandist before a tribunal, to prove the reasonable truth of
his assertion or endure the humiliation of publishing prominently a
finding against his character.
This whole subject is immensely difficult, and full of traps. It
would be well worth an intensive investigation by a group of pub-
lishers, lawyers, and students of public affairs. Because in some form
or other the next generation will attempt to bring the publishing
business under greater social control. There is everywhere an in-
creasingly angry disillusionment about the press, a growing sense of
being baffled and misled; and wise publishers will not pooh-pooh
these omens. They might well note the history of prohibition, where
a failure to work out a programme of temperance brought about an
undiscriminating taboo. The regulation of the publishing business
is a subtle and elusive matter, and only by an early and sympathetic
effort to deal with great evils can the more sensible minds retain their
control. If publishers and authors themselves do not face the facts
and attempt to deal with them, some day Congress, in a fit of temper,
egged on by an outraged public opinion, will operate on the press
with an ax. For somehow the community must find a way of making
the men who publish news accept responsibility for an honest effort
not to misrepresent the facts.
But the phrase “honest effort” does not take us very far. The prob-
lem here is not different from that which we begin dimly to appre-
hend in the field of government and business administration. The
untrained amateur may mean well, but he knows not how to do well.
Why should he? What are the qualifications for being a surgeon? A
certain minimum of special training. What are the qualifications for
operating daily on the brain and heart of a nation? None. Go some
time and listen to the average run of questions asked in interviews
with Cabinet officers or anywhere else.
I remember one reporter who was detailed to the Peace Con-
ference by a leading news-agency. He came around every day for
“news.” It was a time when Central Europe seemed to be disintegrat-
ing, and great doubt existed as to whether governments would be
found with which to sign a peace. But all that this “reporter” wanted
to know was whether the German fleet, then safely interned at Scapa
Flow, was going to be sunk in the North Sea. He insisted every day
on knowing that. For him it was the German fleet or nothing. Finally,
he could endure it no longer. So he anticipated Admiral Reuther and
announced, in a dispatch to his home papers, that the fleet would be
sunk. And when I say that a million American adults learned all that
they ever learned about the Peace Conference through this reporter, I
am stating a very moderate figure.
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He suggests the delicate question raised by the schools of jour-
nalism: how far can we go in turning newspaper enterprise from
a haphazard trade into a disciplined profession? Quite far, I imag-
ine, for it is altogether unthinkable that a society like ours should
remain forever dependent upon untrained accidental witnesses. It is
no answer to say that there have been in the past, and that there are
now, first-rate correspondents. Of course there are. Men like Brails-
ford, Oulahan, Gibbs, Lawrence, Swope, Strunsky, Draper, Hard,
Dillon, Lowry, Levine, Ackerman, Ray Stannard Baker, Frank Cobb,
and William Allen White, know their way about in this world. But
they are eminences on a rather flat plateau. The run of the news is
handled by men of much smaller caliber. It is handled by such men
because reporting is not a dignified profession for which men will
invest the time and cost of an education, but an underpaid, insecure,
anonymous form of drudgery, conducted on catch-as-catch-can prin-
ciples. Merely to talk about the reporter in terms of his real impor-
tance to civilization will make newspaper men laugh. Yet reporting
is a post of peculiar honor. Observation must precede every other
activity, and the public observer (that is, the reporter) is a man of
critical value. No amount of money or effort spent in fitting the right
men for this work could possibly be wasted, for the health of society
depends upon the quality of the information it receives.
Do our schools of journalism, the few we have, make this kind of
training their object, or are they trade-schools designed to fit men for
higher salaries in the existing structure? I do not presume to answer
the question, nor is the answer of great moment when we remember
how small a part these schools now play in actual journalism. But
it is important to know whether it would be worth while to endow
large numbers of schools on the model of those now existing, and
make their diplomas a necessary condition for the practice of report-
ing. It is worth considering. Against the idea lies the fact that it is
difficult to decide just what reporting is—where in the whole mass
of printed matter it begins and ends. No one would wish to set up a
closed guild of reporters and thus exclude invaluable casual report-
ing and writing. If there is anything in the idea at all, it would apply
only to the routine service of the news through large organizations.
Personally I should distrust too much ingenuity of this kind, on
the ground that, while it might correct certain evils, the general ten-
dency would be to turn the control of the news over to unenterpris-
ing stereotyped minds soaked in the traditions of a journalism always
ten years out of date. The better course is to avoid the deceptive short
cuts, and make up our minds to send out into reporting a generation
of men who will by sheer superiority, drive the incompetents out of
business. That means two things. It means a public recognition of
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the dignity of such a career, so that it will cease to be the refuge of
the vaguely talented. With this increase of prestige must go a profes-
sional training in journalism in which the ideal of objective testimony
is cardinal. The cynicism of the trade needs to be abandoned, for the
true patterns of the journalistic apprentice are not the slick persons
who scoop the news, but the patient and fearless men of science who
have labored to see what the world really is. It does not matter that
the news is not susceptible of mathematical statement. In fact, just
because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the
exercise of the highest of the scientific virtues. They are the habits of
ascribing no more credibility to a statement than it warrants, a nice
sense of the probabilities, and a keen understanding of the quan-
titative importance of particular facts. You can judge the general
reliability of any observer most easily by the estimate he puts upon
the reliability of his own report. If you have no facts of your own
with which to check him, the best rough measurement is to wait and
see whether he is aware of any limitations in himself; whether he
knows that he saw only part of the event he describes; and whether
he has any background of knowledge against which he can set what
he thinks he has seen.
This kind of sophistication is, of course, necessary for the merest
pretense to any education. But for different professions it needs to
be specialized in particular ways. A sound legal training is pervaded
by it, but the skepticism is pointed to the type of case with which the
lawyer deals. The reporter’s work is not carried on under the same
conditions, and therefore requires a different specialization. How he
is to acquire it is, of course, a pedagogical problem requiring an in-
ductive study of the types of witness and the sources of information
with whom the reporter is in contact.
Some time in the future, when men have thoroughly grasped the
role of public opinion in society, scholars will not hesitate to write
treatises on evidence for the use of news-gathering services. No
such treatise exists to-day, because political science has suffered from
that curious prejudice of the scholar which consists in regarding an
irrational phenomenon as not quite worthy of serious study.
Closely akin to an education in the tests of credibility is rigor-
ous discipline in the use of words. It is almost impossible to over-
estimate the confusion in daily life caused by sheer inability to use
language with intention. We talk scornfully of “mere words.” Yet
through words the whole vast process of human communication
takes place. The sights and sounds and meanings of nearly all that
we deal with as “politics,” we learn, not by our own experience, but
through the words of others. If those words are meaningless lumps
charged with emotion, instead of the messengers of fact, all sense of
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evidence breaks down. Just so long as big words like Bolshevism,
Americanism, patriotism, pro-Germanism, are used by reporters to
cover anything and anybody that the biggest fool at large wishes to
include, just so long shall we be seeking our course through a fog so
dense that we cannot tell whether we fly upside-down or right-side-
up. It is a measure of our education as a people that so many of us
are perfectly content to live our political lives in this fraudulent envi-
ronment of unanalyzed words. For the reporter, abracadabra is fatal.
So long as he deals in it, he is gullibility itself, seeing nothing of the
world, and living, as it were, in a hall of crazy mirrors.
Only the discipline of a modernized logic can open the door to
reality. An overwhelming part of the dispute about “freedom of opin-
ion” turns on words which mean different things to the censor and
the agitator. So long as the meanings of the words are not dissoci-
ated, the dispute will remain a circular wrangle. Education that shall
make men masters of their vocabulary is one of the central interests
of liberty. For such an education alone can transform the dispute into
debate from similar premises.
A sense of evidence and a power to define words must for the
modern reporter be accompanied by a working knowledge of the
main stratifications and currents of interest. Unless he knows that
“news” of society almost always starts from a special group, he is
doomed to report the surface of events. He will report the ripples
of a passing steamer, and forget the tides and the currents and the
ground-swell. He will report what Kolchak or Lenin says, and see
what they do only when it confirms what he thinks they said. He
will deal with the flicker of events and not with their motive. There
are ways of reading that flicker so as to discern the motive, but they
have not been formulated in the light of recent knowledge. Here is
big work for the student of politics. The good reporter reads events
with an intuition trained by wide personal experience. The poor
reporter cannot read them, because he is not even aware that there is
anything in particular to read.
And then the reporter needs a general sense of what the world
is doing. Emphatically he ought not to be serving a cause, no mat-
ter how good. In his professional activity it is no business of his to
care whose ox is gored. To be sure, when so much reporting is ex
parte, and hostile to insurgent forces, the insurgents in self-defense
send out ex parte reporters of their own. But a community cannot
rest content to learn the truth about the Democrats by reading the
Republican papers, and the truth about the Republicans by reading
the Democratic papers. There is room, and there is need, for disinter-
ested reporting; and if this sounds like a counsel of perfection now,
it is only because the science of public opinion is still at the point
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where astronomy was when theological interests proclaimed the
conclusions that all research must vindicate.
While the reporter will serve no cause, he will possess a steady
sense that the chief purpose of “news” is to enable mankind to live
successfully toward the future. He will know that the world is a
process, not by any means always onward and upward, but never
quite the same. As the observer of the signs of change, his value to
society depends upon the prophetic discrimination with which he
selects those signs.
But the news from which he must pick and choose has long since
become too complicated even for the most highly trained reporter.
The work, say, of the government is really a small part of the day’s
news, yet even the wealthiest and most resourceful newspapers fail in
their efforts to report “Washington.” The high lights and the disputes
and sensational incidents are noted, but no one can keep himself
informed about his Congressman or about the individual depart-
ments, by reading the daily press. This failure in no way reflects on
the newspapers. It results from the intricacy and unwieldiness of the
subject-matter. Thus, it is easier to report Congress than it is to report
the departments, because the work of Congress crystallizes crudely
every so often in a roll-call. But administration, although it has be-
come more important than legislation, is hard to follow, because its
results are spread over a longer period of time, and its effects are felt
in ways that no reporter can really measure.
Theoretically Congress is competent to act as the critical eye on
administration. Actually, the investigations of Congress are almost
always planless raids, conducted by men too busy and too little in-
formed to do more than catch the grosser evils, or intrude upon good
work that is not understood. It was a recognition of these difficulties
that was the cause of two very interesting experiments in late years.
One was the establishment of more or less semi-official institutes of
government research; the other, the growth of specialized private
agencies which attempt to give technical summaries of the work of
various branches of the government. Neither experiment has created
much commotion: yet together they illustrate an idea which, prop-
erly developed, will be increasingly valuable to an enlightened public
opinion.
Their principle is simple. They are expert organized reporters.
Having no horror of dullness, no interest in being dramatic, they
can study statistics and orders and reports which are beyond the
digestive powers of a newspaper man or of his readers. The lines of
their growth would seem to be threefold: to make a current record,
to make a running analysis of it, and on the basis of both, to suggest
plans.
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Record and analysis require an experimental formulation of stan-
dards by which the work of government can be tested. Such stan-
dards are not to be evolved off-hand out of anyone’s consciousness.
Some have already been worked out experimentally, others still need
to be discovered; all need to be refined and brought into perspective
by the wisdom of experience. Carried out competently, the public
would gradually learn to substitute objective criteria for gossip and
intuitions. One can imagine a public-health service subjected to such
expert criticism. The institute of research publishes the death-rate as
a whole for a period of years. It seems that for a particular season the
rate is bad in certain maladies, that in others the rate of improvement
is not sufficiently rapid. These facts are compared with the expen-
ditures of the service, and with the main lines of its activity. Are the
bad results due to the causes beyond the control of the service? do
they indicate a lack of foresight in asking appropriations for spe-
cial work? or in the absence of novel phenomena, do they point to a
decline of the personnel, or in its morale? If the latter, further analy-
sis may reveal that salaries are too low to attract men of ability, or
that the head of the service by bad management has weakened the
interest of his staff.
When the work of government is analyzed in some such way as
this, the reporter deals with a body of knowledge that has been or-
ganized for his apprehension. In other words, he is able to report the
“news,” because between him and the raw material of government
there has been interposed a more or less expert political intelligence.
He ceases to be the ant, described by William James, whose view of a
building was obtained by crawling over the cracks in the walls.
These political observatories will, I think, be found useful in all
branches of government, national, state, municipal, industrial, and
even in foreign affairs. They should be clearly out of reach either of
the wrath or of the favor of the office-holders. They must, of course,
be endowed, but the endowment should be beyond the immediate
control of the legislature and of the rich patron. Their independence
can be partially protected by the terms of the trust; the rest must be
defended by the ability of the institute to make itself so much the
master of the facts as to be impregnably based on popular confi-
dence.
One would like to think that the universities could be brought into
such a scheme. Were they in close contact with the current record
and analysis, there might well be a genuine “field work” in political
science for the students; and there could be no better directing idea
for their more advanced researches than the formulation of the in-
tellectual methods by which the experience of government could be
brought to usable control. After all, the purpose of studying “politi-
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cal science” is to be able to act more effectively in politics, the word
effectively being understood in the largest and, therefore, the ideal
sense. In the universities men should be able to think patiently and
generously for the good of society. If they do not, surely one of the
reasons is that thought terminates in doctor’s theses and brown quar-
terlies, and not in the critical issues of politics.
On first thought, all this may seem rather a curious direction for
an inquiry into the substance of liberty. Yet we have always known,
as a matter of common sense, that there was an intimate connection
between “liberty” and the use of liberty. Every one who has exam-
ined the subject at all has had to conclude that tolerance per se is
an arbitrary line, and that, in practice, the determining factor is the
significance of the opinion to be tolerated. This study is based on
an avowal of that fact. Once it is avowed, there seems to be no way
of evading the conclusion that liberty is not so much permission as
it is the construction of a system of information increasingly inde-
pendent of opinion. In the long run it looks as if opinion could be
made at once free and enlightening only by transferring our interest
from “opinion” to the objective realities from which it springs. This
thought has led us to speculations on ways of protecting and orga-
nizing the stream of news as the source of all opinion that matters.
Obviously these speculations do not pretend to offer a fully consid-
ered or a completed scheme. Their nature forbids it, and I should be
guilty of the very opinionativeness I have condemned, did these es-
says claim to be anything more than tentative indications of the more
important phases of the problem.
Yet I can well imagine their causing a considerable restlessness in
the minds of some readers. Standards, institutes, university research,
schools of journalism, they will argue, may be all right, but they are
a gray business in a vivid world. They blunt the edge of life; they
leave out of account the finely irresponsible opinion thrown out by
the creative mind; they do not protect the indispensable novelty from
philistinism and oppression. These proposals of yours, they will
say, ignore the fact that such an apparatus of knowledge will in the
main be controlled by the complacent and the traditional, and the
execution will inevitably be illiberal.
There is force in the indictment. And yet I am convinced that we
shall accomplish more by fighting for truth than by fighting for our
theories. It is a better loyalty. It is a humbler one, but it is also more
irresistible. Above all it is educative. For the real enemy is ignorance,
from which all of us, conservative, liberal, and revolutionary, suf-
fer. If our effort is concentrated on our desires,—be it our desire to
have and to hold what is good, our desire to remake peacefully, or
our desire to transform suddenly,—we shall divide hopelessly and
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irretrievably. We must go back of our opinions to the neutral facts
for unity and refreshment of spirit. To deny this, it seems to me, is to
claim that the mass of men is impervious to education, and to deny
that, is to deny the postulate of democracy, and to seek salvation
in a dictatorship. There is, I am convinced, nothing but misery and
confusion that way. But I am equally convinced that democracy will
degenerate into this dictatorship either of the Right or of the Left, if
it does not become genuinely self-governing. That means, in terms
of public opinion, a resumption of that contact between beliefs and
realities which we have been losing steadily since the small-town
democracy was absorbed into the Great Society.
The administration of public information toward greater accuracy
and more successful analysis is the highway of liberty. It is, I believe,
a matter of first-rate importance that we should fix this in our minds.
Having done so, we may be able to deal more effectively with the
traps and the lies and the special interests which obstruct the road
and drive us astray. Without a clear conception of what the means
of liberty are, the struggle for free speech and free opinion easily
degenerates into a mere contest of opinion.
But realization is not the last step, though it is the first. We need
be under no illusion that the stream of news can be purified simply
by pointing out the value of purity. The existing news-structure may
be made serviceable to democracy along the general lines suggested,
by the training of the journalist, and by the development of expert
record and analysis. But while it may be, it will not be, simply by
saying that it ought to be. Those who are now in control have too
much at stake, and they control the source of reform itself.
Change will come only by the drastic competition of those whose
interests are not represented in the existing news-organization. It
will come only if organized labor and militant liberalism set a pace
which cannot be ignored. Our sanity and, therefore, our safety de-
pend upon this competition, upon fearless and relentless exposure
conducted by self-conscious groups that are now in a minority. It is
for these groups to understand that the satisfaction of advertising
a pet theory is as nothing compared to the publication of the news.
And having realized it, it is for them to combine their resources and
their talent for the development of an authentic news-service which
is invincible because it supplies what the community is begging for
and cannot get.
All the gallant little sheets expressing particular programmes are
at bottom vanity, and in the end, futility, so long as the reporting of
daily news is left in untrained and biased hands. If we are to move
ahead, we must see a great independent journalism, setting standards
for commercial journalism, like those which the splendid English
3 liberty and the news 33
coöperative societies are setting for commercial business. An enor-
mous amount of money is dribbled away in one fashion or another
on little papers, mass-meetings, and what not. If only some consider-
able portion of it could be set aside to establish a central international
news-agency, we should make progress. We cannot fight the un-
truth which envelops us by parading our opinions. We can do it only
by reporting the facts, and we do not deserve to win if the facts are
against us.
The country is spotted with benevolent foundations of one kind or
another, many of them doing nothing but pay the upkeep of fine
buildings and sinecures. Organized labor spends large sums of
money on politics and strikes which fail because it is impossible to
secure a genuine hearing in public opinion. Could there be a pooling
of money for a news-agency? Not, I imagine, if its object were to fur-
ther a cause. But suppose the plan were for a news-service in which
editorial matter was rigorously excluded, and the work was done
by men who had already won the confidence of the public by their
independence? Then, perhaps.
At any rate, our salvation lies in two things: ultimately, in the infu-
sion of the news-structure by men with a new training and outlook;
immediately, in the concentration of the independent forces against
the complacency and bad service of the routineers. We shall advance
when we have learned humility; when we have learned to seek the
truth, to reveal it and publish it; when we care more for that than for
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